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Abstract

The aim of this study was to examine young children's understanding of
superstitions—specifically bad luck superstitions. Children between the ages of 4 and 9
received a set of interview questions concerning their experiences with superstitions, their
beliefs about the efficacy of superstitions, and their knowledge of the mental and physical
components of superstitions. Participants also completed a belief task designed to assess
the relative importance of belief and action in superstitions.
The findings indicate developmental patterns in children's awareness of
superstitions and beliefs in efficacy of superstitions. With age, children demonstrated a
significantly greater awareness of superstitions. In contrast, children demonstrated a
significant decrease in beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions by the age of seven.
Regarding children's perceptions of the necessary components of superstitions, there
were important similarities in the developmental pattern of children's responses. Across
all age groups, the action component of a superstition (as opposed to a belief component)
was found to be the primary factor in effectiveness of superstitions to "bring bad luck."
These findings are discussed in relation to children's beliefs about good luck
superstitions, magic, wishing, prayer, and the potential modes of cultural transmission of
supernatural beliefs.

vi

Literature Review

An essential element of human nature is our quest to make sense of the world.
Individuals search for explanations about everything from the creation of the earth to why
the Yankee baseball pitcher pitched a no run game. Was it the wind? Was it his lucky
socks? Was it God? In our society, scientific evidence has been hailed as the most
accepted method of interpreting our wondrous world. Both children and adults call on
scientific reasoning to predict and explain events in their environment. Through science,
"we aim for objectivity: basing conclusions on external validation. And we avoid
mysticism: basing conclusions on personal insights that elude external validation"
(Shermer, 1997, p. 20).
At what point do young people begin using science as a means for explaining
events in the world? Research demonstrates that scientific knowledge can be present
even in early childhood. In fact, a growing body of empirical work documents children's
understanding of the scientific processes that function in the world. For example, studies
by Leslie and Keeble (1987) and Cohen and Oakes (1993) indicated that even infants
have a general understanding of physical causality. These studies systematically
investigated infants' perceptions of causality by presenting direct launching events in
which one object moves across a computer screen and hits a second object. The results
suggest that infants as young as 7 to 10 months of age demonstrate an ability to recognize
causal relationships among objects. In addition, other studies documented how
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preschoolers use their scientific knowledge of physical causality to predict and explain a
multitude of events (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Goswami, 1991; Shultz,
1982).
With such evidence of children's basic understanding of scientific principles, the
questions arise as to when and why children use magic as a causal explanation of events.
Magical forces not only fall outside the realm of natural causality but also violate
children's early scientific principles. To better understand the interplay between magical
and scientific reasoning, it is important to first define and explore the magical belief
systems prevalent in our culture.
Oxford American Dictionarie (Abate, 1998) defines magic as being "a supposed
act of influencing the course of events supernaturally" (p. 359) and defines supernatural
as "thought to reveal some force above the laws of nature" (p. 601). According to these
definitions, magical belief systems may include—but are not limited to—wishing,
astrology, numerology, and superstition. Such belief systems have existed for many
centuries; for example, the superstitious act of knocking on wood to promote a positive
outcome is thought to have first originated in Ancient Greece. Men of this time believed
that trees housed spirits and sought protection from evil by touching a tree (Marmor,
1956).
In America today, evidence of magical beliefs dominate our popular culture
(Gmelch & Felson, 1980; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wayne, & Sherrod, 1989). Vyse (2000) notes
that 1200 of the 1750 newspapers distributed throughout the nation include astrological
columns, and Gallop polls from 1994 report that 25% of Americans believe in astrology.
In addition, a multitude of television programs and movies, such as the X-files, Ghost,
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Phenomenon, City of Angels, and The Sixth Sense, focus on paranormal forces such as
aliens, ghosts, or Extra Sensory Perception. This pervasive climate of magical and
supernatural beliefs may have direct consequences on the development of magical beliefs
in children.
Recently, a number of investigators have focused on children's magical beliefs
and their use of magical explanations. Regarding children's beliefs in magical entities,
parental reports as well as verbal and behavioral measures of young children's beliefs
indicate that many children between the ages of 3 and 8 believe in magical beings such as
Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny, ghosts, and monsters (Harris, Brown,
Marriot, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling,
1994, 1999; Woolley, 1999). In addition, another recently documented phenomenon
involving magical beliefs is that of children's imaginary companions. Estimates of the
frequency of children having imaginary companions range between 25% and 65%, with
the highest incidence occurring between 3 and 8 years of age (Singer & Singer, 1990;
Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 1993). This information suggests a fundamental
difference between the way children and adults perceive the realm of magic.
However, when we look at the way in which children and adults use magic as a
causal explanation for real world physical events, the evidence indicates that both adults
and children resort to using magical explanations for events when they have no apparent
physical or scientific causal explanation. In a study by Phelps and Woolley (1994),
children between the ages of 4 and 8 were given a magical belief interview and a series of
event tasks. Data from the interview showed an age-related decrease in children's beliefs
in the real existence of magical entities (such as fairies) and magical powers. The event
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task was broken into two parts: prediction and explanation. In the prediction section,
children were asked to guess what might happen in a particular scenario (e.g., magnets
repelling one another, a quarter "disappearing" in a box). In the explanation section,
children were shown the event about which they made a prediction and asked to explain
the cause of the event. There were four predictive variables: age; magical belief
classification (high, moderate, low-based on the interview responses); accurate
predictions; and availability of accurate physical explanations. Of the four variables, only
the final factor, that of having reasonable physical explanations for the events, was found
to account for a significant portion of the variance in children's claims of magic. Thus,
whether or not children claimed to believe in magical entities and supernatural forces in
the interview did not relate to their use of magic to explain physical events. According to
this study, children are similar to adults in that when they have physical principles
available to explain events they do not make use of magical explanations.
So there appears to be a discrepancy between children's beliefs in magical entities
(which are numerous and robust) and their beliefs that magic is a force operating in the
real world (which is limited). In line with this difference, an additional distinction needs
to be made between what children call "magical" and children's beliefs and actions that
we, as adults, may call magical because they violate our understanding of natural causal
forces. Piaget (1929) defined children's "magical thinking" from this adult perspective as
a broad category of mental and physical acts that include several sub-categories: (a)
"magic by participation between thoughts and things" (e.g., wishing for a new bike and
getting one); (b) "magic by participation between actions and things" (e.g., crossing your
fingers and winning a lottery); and (c) "magic by participation between objects" (e.g.,
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finding treasure buried under a four leaf clover). According to Piaget, young children
routinely engage in these forms of magical thinking involving a misinterpretation of the
underlying causes of physical events. These forms of magical thinking have less to do
with the "fairy and monster" realm of magic than they do with wishing and superstitions.
Several recent developmental studies have focused on Piaget's (1929) first
category of magical thinking, "magic by participation between thoughts and things."
These studies address children's beliefs in the power of mental-physical causality; that is,
a mental act (e.g., imagining, wishing, or praying) having a physical consequence in the
real world. Conceptually, imagining, wishing, and praying have a number of features in
common, the most important being that they all involve internal mental processes aimed
at changing the external world in some way.
Woolley and Phelps (1994) investigated young children's understanding of
imagination as an effective means of mental-physical causality. Forty-two children
between the ages of 3 and 5 participated in a task that included a verbal and behavioral
measure of their beliefs in the real existence of an imagined object. The procedure
involved having a child imagine or "make a picture in their head" of an object inside an
empty box. Children's belief in the existence of this object were assessed verbally ("Is
there tape in this box?" and "Is it real tape or pretend tape?"), and also behaviorally by
testing if the child would hand the box with the imagined object to an adult in need of the
particular object. Results show a difference between the beliefs and actions of young 3year-olds as compared to older 3-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds. Young 3-year-olds
were more likely to verbally affirm the existence of the imagined object in the box, and to
actually hand over the box to the experimenter. However, a significant majority of all
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subjects (ages 3-5) displayed a clear understanding of the nonexistence of the imagined
contents when assessed behaviorally. Woolley and Phelps (1994) suggested that children
under 4 years of age might experience confusion about whether imagining or thinking
can actually change physical reality.
Woolley, Phelps, Davis, and Mandell (1999) explored the connection between
mental acts and the physical world in a second type of magical causality - wishing. In a
two-part study involving 92 children between the ages of 3 and 6, the researchers
assessed children's beliefs in the efficacy and magical nature of wishing. In one task,
children were asked to state whether events were magical or ordinary. The events
included commonly portrayed magical events (e.g., frog turning into a princess) and
nonmagical events (e.g., flipping on a light switch and a light coming on). Children also
were asked if a wish coming true would be magical or not magical. Results indicate that
older children (5- and 6-year-olds) classify wishing as a magical event, as do the younger
children (3- and 4-year-olds); however, the majority of young children also purport that
turning on the light is magical. In accord with the findings from the magical belief study
by Phelps and Woolley (1994), when children are not equipped with scientific or physical
explanations, they may be more likely to claim the event is magical. Overall beliefs in the
efficacy of wishing decrease in children between the ages of 3 and 6.
A third form of mental-physical causality that has received recent attention is
prayer. Prayer is similar to imagining and wishing in that the objective is to alter the
world through a focused thought, but with prayer, there is the added element of a divine
intermediary, such as God. In a study by Woolley and Phelps (2001), 3- to 8-year-old
children were asked structured interview questions and instructed to respond to tasks
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designed to assess their concepts of prayer. Children were asked questions such as "How
does God hear your prayers?" and "Who makes your prayers come true?" In one task,
children were asked to teach a puppet how to pray. Researchers examined the mental and
physical components children reported as characteristic of prayer (e.g., bowing head,
clasping hands, thinking). The results support a clear developmental trend, with 3- and 4year-olds claiming the physical aspects of prayer (closing eyes) are more important than
mental ones (thinking), and 7- and 8-year-old children claiming that mental components
are more important than the physical ones. Concerning beliefs in the efficacy of prayer, at
age 4, children begin having a general idea that prayer "works" and this belief appears to
increase through age 8.
Very little research has been done to address Piaget's (1929) second and third
categories of magical thinking: "participation between actions and things," and
"participation between objects and objects." These forms of magic are more closely
related to what we commonly view as superstitions, such as knocking on wood or picking
a four leaf clover for good luck. Tobacyk (1991) describes superstition as the tendency to
create an "illusory correlation." He defines an illusory correlation as one in which people
imagine or overestimate relationships between two variables. Similarly, Alcock (1995)
defines superstition as "the interpreting of two closely occurring events as though one
caused the other, without any concern for the causal link" (p. 15). A more culturally
relativistic definition suggests, "superstition should be reserved for beliefs or practices
groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of enlightenment reached by
the community to which one belongs" (Marmor, 1956, p. 119). While this approach
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implies a very negative view of superstitions, it also allows for knowledge and beliefs
systems to evolve within a culture.
Alcock (1995) states that 19th century thinkers believed that universal education
would lead to a decrease in superstitious beliefs. However, he claims that "high literacy
rates and universal education have done little to decrease such beliefs" (p. 15).
Superstitious beliefs are evident in individuals with and without formal education as well
as in both rural and urban areas. Vyse (2000) suggested that people with a college
education may be more likely to subscribe to social and occupational-specific
superstitions, such as exam or business related superstitions. Blum (1976) reported that
within American society as a whole, there is abundant evidence of beliefs in many
common superstitions (e.g., walking under a ladder brings bad luck, crossing your fingers
brings good luck).
Why are these beliefs so prevalent in a culture that strongly supports scientific
methods of inquiry and scientific explanations? Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski
suggests the "theory of the gap" to explain the ubiquity of superstitious beliefs and acts
(as cited in Campbell, 1996). His theory states that despite our vast array of scientific
knowledge, uncertainty still exists regarding the underlying causes of many events, and
this uncertainty leads people to experience anxiety about the unknown. When an
individual lacks control, feels uncertain, or is without information about the outcome of
an event, he/she may be more prone to superstitious beliefs and behavior (Jahoda, 1969;
Keinan, 1994). For example, a student who feels anxious about taking an exam may feel
compelled to pick up a penny off the floor, in hopes that it will bring good luck.
Similarly, a first time flyer might knock on wood after hearing a flight attendant boast
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about his/her airline's safety record. These acts permit the individual to gain some sense
of control over an uncertain outcome. As Zeiler (1972) states, "superstition refers to
behaviors which are emitted as if they have environmental consequences, but in fact do
not" (p. 2).
A perfect example of this type of behavior is evidenced in a study conducted by
Rozin, Markwith, and Ross (1990). Adult subjects were given two glasses of water. The
subjects observed sugar being added into each glass; they were then instructed to place
labels on the glasses: one read CYANIDE and the other read SUGAR. When encouraged
to drink from both glasses, subjects consistently preferred to drink from the glass labeled
SUGAR. Despite placing the labels on each glass themselves, people avoided the water
labeled CYANIDE due to the fear of a possible link between the liquid and the poison.
As adults, these illusory correlations may be compelling, even though our rational
side refutes them. Campbell (1996) utilizes the idea of a half-belief to explain this
phenomenon. He describes individuals who may negate the idea of bad luck, but
purposely avoid walking under a ladder. Oftentimes, he claims, people may realize that a
belief is irrational or unjustifiable, yet still perform the superstitious act. If there is a high
cost to performing the act (e.g., people are watching, or it is difficult to walk around the
ladder in a particular setting), one is less likely to do it. However, if there is a low cost to
behaving superstitiously (e.g., no one is around, or it is just as easy to walk around the
ladder as it is to walk under it), people may choose the superstitious route just in case
there may be a small chance of some causal connection.
These findings in the adult literature bring into question how children, like adults,
might employ superstitions in their struggle to make sense of and control their world. To
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what extent are children knowledgeable of superstitions? Do they view superstitions as a
credible means of causality? What do children perceive to be the roles of belief and
action in superstitions? The purpose of the present study is to explore young children's
understanding of superstitions and to further advance three areas of research: (a)
children's magical beliefs and use of magical explanations, (b) children's magical
thinking as defined by Piaget's (1929) three sub-categories of magical thinking, and (c)
children's superstitious beliefs and acts as compared to those of the adult population.
Recently, a graduate student in Western Kentucky University's School
Psychology program investigated these questions as regards good luck (Bryce, 2001).
The study included an interview task and belief task. The interview questions addressed
children's knowledge of and belief in good luck and superstitions. Findings indicated a
significant increase in children's knowledge of superstitions between the ages of 5 and 9
and a significant decrease in children's belief in efficacy of superstitions across the same
age span. The belief task consisted of twelve stories with drawings of children engaging
in superstitious acts and claiming to believe or not believe in their "lucky" effects. After
each scenario, children were asked if the story character would really have good luck.
Children of all ages reported the highest rate of belief in superstitious outcomes when
characters claimed to believe in superstitions and engaged in actions to support their
beliefs. (Percentages of affirmative responses across ages in each condition: Action,
64%; Belief, 51%; No Belief, 41%; No Action, 28%).

Based on the intuitive understanding that children and adults form positive
emotional associations with good luck events and negative emotional associations with
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bad luck events, it is reasonable to assume that there may be significant differences in
children's belief s regarding these two types of superstitions. Specifically, as adults may
want to protect children and children may find comfort in refusing to believe in bad luck,
it is expected that children will exhibit knowledge of bad luck superstitions at a later age
than they know about good luck superstitions. In addition, it is expected that children's
overall claims in the efficacy of bad luck superstitions will be lower in comparison with
their claims of the efficacy of the good luck superstitions. Finally, although children may
have varying knowledge of and beliefs in good vs. bad luck superstitions, it is expected
that the relative influences of action and belief in children's claims of events "really
happening" will be consistent; that is, in this study of bad luck superstitions, as in the
previous study of good luck, children will be most likely to claim an event will really
happen when characters engage in supportive actions and least likely to claim an event
will really happen when characters do not engage in any actions.

Method
Participants
Participants in this study were 48 children between the ages of 4 and 9 with
approximately equal number of males and females. The sample consisted of sixteen 4- to
5-year-olds, sixteen 6- to 7-year-olds, and sixteen 8- to 9-year olds. Children were
recruited from a low to middle-class public school and a middle class day care center in
the western region of Kentucky. This study was approved by the Human Subjects
Review Board of Western Kentucky University (see Appendix A).
Materials
Belief interview. The complete set of interview questions is included at the end of
this document (see Appendix B). The format of the interview is similar to instruments
used in previous studies (e.g., Bryce, 2001; Woolley & Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps,
2001; Woolley et al., 1999), and the content addresses children's knowledge of and
beliefs in superstitions. The subjects were given the opportunity to answer a series of
open-ended and forced choice questions concerning superstitions. More specifically,
questions probed children's knowledge of superstitions, beliefs in the efficacy of
superstitious acts, and understanding of the necessary components (mental and/or
physical) of superstitions. First, children were asked, "Do you know what a superstition
or saying about luck is?" (Question 1). If subjects answered this question affirmatively,
they were asked, "Can you explain what it is to me?" (Question 2), and "What would be
an example about something that brings good or bad luck?" (Question 3). Participants
also were asked: "Do you believe that is true?" "Has it ever happened to you?" and "Did
it really work?" (Questions 3a, 3b, 3c).

12

13

Children were then presented with the following saying: "Step on a crack, break
your mother's back." Next, they were asked, "Have you ever heard of that saying?" "Do
you think that it is true?" "Have you ever done that?" and "Did it really work?"
(Questions 4a-d). Following this, children were asked, "Can you think of any other
special beliefs or sayings that bring good or bad luck?" If subjects answered this question
affirmatively, they were asked, "Do you think that is true?" "Have you ever done that?"
and "Did it really work?" (Question 5a-5d, 6a-6d).
Children's concepts of luck were further explored in Questions 7 - 1 6 : "Do you
think there is really such a thing as luck - having good luck or bad luck?" "What are
some examples of things that might happen if you have good luck?" "What are some
examples of things that might happen if you have bad luck?" "Do some people have more
good luck than other people, or is it even? If so, then who?" "Can anyone have good
luck?" "What do you have to do to get good luck?" "Who told you about good luck?"
"Do some people have more bad luck than other people, or is it even? If so, then who?"
"Can anyone have bad luck?" "What do you have to do to get bad luck?" "Who told you
about bad luck?"
Children were asked if they have heard of a number of objects bringing bad luck
(breaking a mirror, stepping on a spider, walking under a ladder, black cat crossing one's
path, touching a window, spilling salt, and the number thirteen - Question 17a-g). A
neutral item (i.e., touching a window bringing bad luck) was included in the list to insure
children were not always responding affirmatively. If subjects had heard of the specific
objects bringing bad luck, they were then asked about its efficacy: "Do you think it really
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works?" Participants were asked, "Do special beliefs or sayings for luck always come
true or just some of the time?" (Question 18).
To evaluate children's perceptions of the mental and physical components of
superstitions, they were asked, "Do you have to really believe it will work for it to come
true?" (Question 19), "When you really want something to come true, what can you do?"
(Question 20), "What if a friend gives you a four leaf clover, who gets good luck?"
(Question 21), "When special beliefs come true, is it because somebody does something
to make it come true, or because it just happens?" (Question 22), (If someone) "Who
does something to make it come true?" (Question 22a).
Final items assessed whether children believed people or things (kids, grown-ups,
babies, cats and dogs, flowers, and tables) can have knowledge and beliefs regarding luck
(Questions 23a-b—28a-b).
Belief task. The belief task protocol and stimuli are included at the end of this
document (see Appendix C and Appendix D). The belief task was administered
immediately following the interview. The main objective of this task is to determine the
perceived relative importance of mental (belief) and/or physical (action) components of
superstition in order for a desired outcome to occur. Twelve scenarios were presented in
random order. The characters in each scenario either engage in (action) or do not engage
in (no action) superstitious behaviors: breaking a mirror; letting a black cat cross the path;
and selecting the number 13 jersey. Characters also either claim to believe or claim not
to believe in the effects of the bad luck superstitions. All three superstitions will be
presented in each of the following four ways: no belief/action, belief/ action, belief/ no
action, and no belief/no action. The following are examples of one set of scenarios:
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"This is Tony. He is a football player. He needs to choose a number for his jersey. Tony
sees a number thirteen jersey. He does not believe that the number 13 will bring bad
luck. He reaches down and picks the number thirteen jersey." (no belief/action); "This is
Juanita. She just joined a soccer team. She needs to choose a number for her jersey.
Juanita sees a number 13 jersey. She believes that the number 13 will bring bad luck.
She picks the number 13 jersey anyway." (belief/ action); "This is Darren. He just
joined a baseball team. Darren sees a number 13 jersey. He believes that the number 13
will bring bad luck. He does not pick the number 13 jersey." (belief/ no action); and
"This is Holly. Holly has a basketball game today. Holly sees a number 13 jersey. She
does not believe that the number 13 will bring bad luck. She does not pick the number 13
jersey." (no belief/no action). As a memory check, children were asked if the character
(a) believed in the superstition and (b) performed the superstitious act. The children were
then asked to predict if the character would have bad luck.
Procedure
An informed consent document (see Appendix E) was distributed to students in
the first, second and third grades at an elementary school in the western region of
Kentucky. Also, an informed consent document was distributed to 4 and 5- year-olds at a
nearby daycare. Those who returned this form received WKU pencils regardless of
whether or not their parents allowed them to participate in the study. Students whose
parents authorized consent participated in the study.
One graduate student was trained on the standardized administration of the belief
interview and the belief task. In order to confirm competence with the experimental
protocol and assess inter-rater reliability, sessions were tape recorded and reviewed by
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the faculty mentor. Within the schools, children were individually removed from their
classrooms and led to a quiet area for a 15- to 20-minute session. Time was first spent
establishing rapport with each subject followed by the administration of the belief
interview and belief task.

Results
Children's Awareness of Superstition
In the belief interview, children were first asked, "Do you know what a
superstition or saying about luck is? (Question 1); only 15% of all children answered this
questions with a response of "yes." Interestingly, although few children claimed to know
about superstitions in general, when asked about specific superstitions many more
children claimed to have heard of them. Children were presented with seven bad luck
superstitions and one neutral item (touching a window) included as a manipulation check
to identify positive response sets. Chi square analyses indicate no significant age
differences for five of the eight superstitions presented. Collapsed across age, the
following percentages of children claimed that they had heard of specific bad luck
superstitions: stepping on a spider, 23%; touching a window, 25%; breaking a mirror,
37%; spilling salt, 42%; and walking under a ladder, 46%. Analyses of children's
responses to the same question regarding three other superstitions did indicate significant
developmental differences for 5-, 7-, and 9- year olds respectively: "Step on a crack,
break your mother's back," 56%, 88%, 100% ( x 2 = 10.667, p < .005); black cat crossing
your path, 37%, 50%, 81% ( x 2 = 6.603, p < .05); and the number thirteen, 25%, 25%,
69% ( x 2 = 8.537, p < . 01).
In order to assess children's overall knowledge of superstitions, children were
assigned a total knowledge score. In belief interview questions 4a, 17al, 17bl, 17cl,
17dl, 17el, 17fl, 17gl, children were asked if they had heard of particular objects and
situations bringing bad luck. Children's affirmative answers were scored as 2, "don't
know was scored as 1, and negative responses were scored as 0. Adding the scores on
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these eight questions yielded a total knowledge score, ranging from 0-16. A (3 age group
X total knowledge score) ANOVA indicated no significant main effect of age on total
knowledge score.
To evaluate another aspect of children's knowledge about superstitions, children
were asked about which entities know about and believe superstitions. Across all age
groups, 85% of the children report that grown-ups know about these sayings. However,
when asked if grown-ups believe these saying come true, the younger children reported a
significant increase in affirmative answers. Chi square analyses indicated developmental
differences for the 5-, 7-, and 9- year olds, respectively: 94%, 62%, 44% ( x 2 = 9.370, p <
.05). The younger children also differed from the older groups in their responses to who
knows about sayings for bad luck, they are as follows: cats and dogs, 37 %, 6%, 6%
(X2 = 9.327, p < .05); flowers, 25%, 0%, 0% ( x 2 = 10.605, p < .05); and tables, 19%,
0%, 0% ( x 2 = 6.400, p < .05). For each of these entities and objects, there was a
decrease in affirmative answers to both the knowledge and belief questions from the 5year olds to the 7-and 9- year olds. The older children were significantly less likely to
claim these entities had knowledge of superstitions and believed they would really come
true.
Another portion of the interview explored children's opinions of who can have
good or bad luck and whether or not they thought some people had more luck, or that
luck is evenly dispersed. Chi square analyses determined no significant developmental
trends appeared; thus scores are reported collapsed across ages. Children were asked,
"Can anyone have good luck?" and "Can anyone have bad luck?" Eighty-nine percent
answered affirmatively to the first question and eighty-five percent answered
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affirmatively to the second question. Children responded similarly to the next items, "Do
some people have more good luck than others, or is it even?" and "Do some people have
more bad luck than others, or is it even?" Eighty-four percent responded "even" for good
luck and seventy-three percent replied "even" for bad luck. When asked, "Do special
beliefs or sayings for luck always come true, or just some of the time?" ninety-one
percent responded "some of the time." Next, children were asked, "When special beliefs
come true, is it because somebody does something to make it come true, or is it because it
just happens?" Across all ages children's responses are as follows: just happens, 58%;
someone makes it happen, 40%' and "don't know," 2%.
Efficacy Beliefs
In addition to assessing children's knowledge of superstitions, the interview was
designed to assess children's beliefs in the efficacy of superstitions—whether they would
"really come true." Participants who responded affirmatively to having heard of
superstitions or sayings about bad luck were asked if they believed these sayings "really
work" (belief interview questions 4d, 17a2, 17b2, 17c2, 17d2, 17e2, 17f2, 17g2). Chi
square analyses on children's affirmative responses indicate developmental differences
for six of the eight superstitions. For the 5-, 7-, and 9- year olds, respectively, the
percentages were as follows: breaking a mirror, 86%, 50%, 14% (%2 = 7.143, p < .05);
walking under a ladder, 100%, 71%, 11% ( x 2 = 12.653, p < .005); black cat crossing
your path, 66%, 37%, 7% ( x 2 = 7.186, p < .05); touching a window, 100% 50%, 0% (x 2
= 7.886, p < .01); spilling salt, 86%, 50%, 11% ( x 2 = 13.906, p < .05); and the number
13, 100%, 50%, 0% (x 2 = 14.372, p < .005). There were no significant differences for

20

two of the eight items, thus the reported percentages are collapsed across the three age
groups: "step on a crack, break your mother's back," 8%; stepping on a spider, 64%.
For these same eight questions, a total belief score was computed by coding
affirmative answers as 2, "don't know" as 1, and negative responses as 0, for a possible
0-16 score. An ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of age on efficacy score, F (2,
38) = 12.378,/? < .0001. Fisher's PSLD indicated beliefs in efficacy of superstitions
declined significantly between the 5- year olds and the 7-year olds, and between the 5year olds and 9- year olds, but not between the 7- and 9- year olds. However, despite
children's overall strong disbelief in efficacy, seventy percent of children across ages
responded affirmatively to "Do you think there really is such a thing as having luck—
having good luck or bad luck?" (Question 7).
Necessary

Components

In the belief task, children's understanding of the mental (i.e., belief) and physical
(i.e., action) components of superstition were assessed. Children were presented with
twelve scenarios; after each scenario, they were asked three questions. The first two
questions were intended to be manipulation checks to test whether subjects attended to
the stories (e.g., "Did Jaunita believe that the number thirteen jersey would bring bad
luck? and "Did Jaunita pick the number thirteen jersey?") The third question asked
whether the bad luck would really happen (e.g., "Do you think Jaunita will have bad
luck?"). Responses to the second question indicated children of all ages were attending
to the tasks (across all ages, 81% answered correctly). However, significant
developmental differences emerged in children's responses to the first question of each
set. An ANOVA indicated a main effect of age on accurate recall of belief responses
F (2,45) = 32.021 , p < .0001. The youngest age group was significantly less accurate in
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their ability to recall the story character's stated belief; however, the 7- and 9- year olds
did not differ significantly. Across all scenarios, an ANOVA revealed no significant age
differences in children's responses to the third question addressing whether the bad luck
would really happen. Overall, 70% of all children only responded 0 or 1 time
affirmatively that a character would really have bad luck. Across all age groups, the
action scenarios produced the highest rate of affirmative responses (32%) followed by: no
belief, 27%; belief, 20%; and no action, 16%. A related question on the interview asked,
"Do you really have to believe it will work for it to come true?" Across all ages, sixty
percent responded affirmatively. However, based on the belief task, children do not view
belief as the primary determining factor in whether someone has luck. Chi square
analyses on both the interview and belief task data indicate no significant effects of
gender.

Discussion
The purpose of the present study is to explore the development of children's
knowledge and understanding of superstitions and also their beliefs regarding the efficacy
of supernatural causal forces. The findings of this study document a growing awareness
of superstitions in the early elementary years. Although some 5-year-old children were
familiar with specific superstitious objects and events, there was increased knowledge of
superstitions by 9 years of age. Knowledge of specific superstitions with the 4- and 5year olds may be due to associating bad luck with just "bad" or "dangerous." Several 4and 5- year olds answered affirmatively to questions such as "Have you ever heard of
breaking a mirror bringing bad luck or spilling salt bringing bad luck?" However, they
followed with such comments as "It would be bad if I broke the mirror because I would
get in trouble," "If I stepped on a spider it might bite me," and "Walking under a ladder is
bad because it might fall on you." It appears that they may have equated actions that
cause bad luck with actions that are bad, or lead them into trouble.
This conflation of "bad luck" and "dangerous" may have influenced children's
responses to our manipulation check item, "touching a window." Twenty-five percent of
children claimed they had heard this would bring bad luck. Some children explained
their responses by the fact that the window could break and they could cut their hand on
the glass. Only two of the 48 children interviewed demonstrated positive response sets,
in that they answered "yes" to knowing all eight bad luck superstitions. As we did not
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question the validity of the manipulation check, these two children's responses were left
in all of the analyses.
It was hypothesized that children would exhibit knowledge of bad luck
superstitions at a later age than they evidenced knowledge of good luck superstitions—as
a sort of "protective" measure. The results from this study do not support that claim. In
fact, the item that produced the greatest percentage of claims of knowledge in the
youngest age group was "Step on a crack, break your mother's back" (56%) followed by
"crossing your fingers" from Bryce's good luck study (52%; 2001). There was no
significant difference in the young children's overall knowledge score across good luck
and bad luck studies. One potential reason for the similarity in developmental trends
across good and bad luck may be that children pass on superstitious beliefs to other
children, rather than learning them from adults. Children may be more eager to scare
their peers than to protect them from thoughts of negative outcomes.
As their knowledge increased, children experienced a concomitant decrease in
their belief in the efficacy of superstitions. This result is supported by the significant
main effect of age on total belief efficacy score. Interestingly whereas children exhibit
skepticism about the ability of specific superstitions to have an effect on the world, they
still buy into the concept of "luck" influencing events in the world. As one 7-year-old
explained, "If you have good luck you might win your baseball game or get an "A."
Another 7-year old stated, "If you spill your tray at lunch, you might have bad luck.
With regard to the concept of "luck" in general terms, children were asked, "Do
some people have more good luck than other people, or is it even?" and "Do some
people have more bad luck than other people, or is it even?" The majority of children
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answered "even," and several made such statements as "God made it even" and "God
wouldn't let some people have more bad luck than others—unless you were bad and you
go to jail." Those children who responded "some people have more" were then asked,
"Who?" One nine-year old explained, "This girl in my class has good luck because she
won Bingo four times in a row." Eight children declared, "Rich people have good luck
and poor people have bad luck."
Why might children subscribe to the notion of luck? Recall that Campbell (1996)
described a half-belief as when individuals uphold superstitions even though they
contradict their rational beliefs in the chance that they have some causal effect on the
world. A 9-year-old described this uncertainty by saying, "A superstition is like Friday
the 13 th —something people believe in and it might or might not come true." In Bryce's
(2001) study of good luck superstitions (2001) one child expressed the limitations of
superstitions by stating that it only "works on little things." With evidence of adults'
half-beliefs (Campbell, 1996; Rozin et al., 1990), it is not surprising that children would
adopt this approach. One child described his reasoning for believing in a black cat
crossing your path superstition as, "I saw it work on the cartoon Arthur." Evidence of
this developing uncertainty was also apparent in the observed increase of the older
groups' reluctance to affirm that grown-ups really believe sayings for luck come true.
The results of the belief task indicate there was consistency across ages and across
good luck and bad luck studies in the purported necessity of action when determining if a
superstition would really occur. The percentages of responses for each condition in both
studies are presented in Table 1. Notice that in both studies, the "no action" condition
produced the fewest affirmative answers and the "action" condition produced the most
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affirmative repsonses. A similar pattern resulted from a belief task that addressed good
luck superstitions (Bryce, 2001/ As adults, we frequently engage in superstitious
behaviors while concurrently admit to not believing in them (Blum, 1976; Campbell,
1996; Rozin, et al., 1990). One could speculate that the physical component of doing
something - or in the case of bad luck avoiding an action (i.e., breaking a mirror, walking
under a ladder) - may give an individual more confidence in the outcome of an event
rather than simply proclaiming a disbelief.
Table 1
Comparison of percentages of children's affirmative responses to whether story
characters in Belief Tasks scenarios would really experience luck.

Bad Luck

Good Luck

Percentages of affirmative answers
No Action

16%

No Action

28%

Belief

20%

No Belief

41%

No Belief

27%

Belief

51%

Action

32%

Action

64%

An additional goal of this research was to investigate how children's developing
concepts of superstitions relate to Piaget's (1929) categories of magical thinking.
Previous studies of children's concepts of imagination, wishing, and prayer (Woolley &
Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Phelps, 2001; Woolley et al., 1999) addressed Piaget's first
category of magical thinking, "magic by participation between thoughts and things." The
present study was specifically designed to test Piaget's second and third categories,
"magic by participation between actions and things" and "magic by participation between
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objects and objects." In the study conducted by Woolley et al. (1999), children
demonstrated an awareness in wishing as early as 3 to 4 years of age. This prevalence of
knowledge in such early years was also seen in studies on magical entities and magical
powers (Harris et al., 1991; Rosengren & Hickling 1994, 1999). The present study
suggests that knowledge of superstitions appears later, between the ages of 7 and 9,
similar to the pattern of children's knowledge of prayer (Woolley & Phelps, 2001).
With regard to children's belief in the efficacy of supernatural events, studies on
children's understanding of magic (Phelps & Woolley, 1994) and wishing (Woolley et
al., 1999) suggest that children's beliefs in these processes working in the real world
decrease with age. A similar pattern emerged in this study of superstitions; 7- and 9year-olds were less likely to report that a superstition will "really work" than were 5year-olds. Interestingly, the opposite pattern was found in studies on prayer; children's
beliefs in the efficacy of prayer increased through the early elementary years (Woolley &
Phelps, 2001). Undoubtedly, this belief is a function of prayer being more strongly
supported by our culture as an acceptable form of supernatural influence. It would be
striking to find a culture in which superstitions were more accepted and encouraged by
the adult population than religious beliefs and practices. In this case, we would expect to
find beliefs in prayer being almost nonexistent and an increase with age in beliefs in the
efficacy of superstitions. Most often, children's beliefs will conform to the adult norm in
the culture surrounding them.
Limitations
A few limitations of this research should be noted. The experimenter in this study
was not blind to the goals of this research, which may have influenced the recording of
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responses. As previously mentioned, children may have confused bad luck as bad
behavior—or just bad in general (e.g., spilling salt). In addition, a different selection of a
bad luck neutral item (other than touching a window) may have been more effective in
identifying positive response sets. Also, the demographics of each group (SES, race, and
disabilities) were not recorded or analyzed; thus these findings may not be generalizable
to the population as a whole or to specific subgroups.
Future Research
The findings from this study add to our knowledge of children's understanding
and usage of magical belief systems. As evidenced by this research, children become
more aware of superstitions throughout their early elementary years, but their beliefs in
the power of superstitions to have an effect on the world decrease with age. When
children did state bad luck would occur, most of the participants across all ages in this
study rated action as the primary factor associated with a superstition's effectiveness.
Additional research is needed to assess the origins of children's knowledge and
beliefs regarding superstitions. What is the relative importance of parents, siblings,
peers, and media in the formation of this knowledge? It is difficult to pinpoint the origin
of this information, but based on this study, children's parents appear to be the primary
source. Although this study did not address the issue, it would be intriguing to
investigate who discourages or encourages children's belief in the efficacy of
superstitions.
As regards individual differences, is the environment the primary determinant of
children's superstitious beliefs (children in the same environment have similar beliefs) or
are children differentially disposed to being "believers" (given the same environmental
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exposure, some children will be skeptics whereas others will be credulous)? Other
factors potentially related to individual differences include children's scientific
knowledge, experiences with supernatural outcomes, susceptibility to peer influence,
fantasy proneness, and religiosity.
Another interesting factor to explore is the impact of socioeconomic status on the
degree in which children believe in luck. In the interview, Questions 10 and 13 asked,
"Do some people have more good/bad luck, or is it even?" Of those children who
responded some people have more good/bad luck than others, almost forty percent
claimed rich people as having more good luck and poor people as having more bad luck.
Unfortunately, we did not assess the socioeconomic status of the respondents
interviewed. Payne (2001) in her book Frameworks of Poverty, identified several hidden
rules among classes. One of importance to this study is how individuals across
socioeconomic classes view their destiny. Her research found that individuals in a high
income class endorse the idea of 'Noblesse Oblige," individuals in a middle class believe
"good personal choices can change one's future," and individuals in a low income class
believe in fate and that they can do little to "mitigate chance." Although this study did
not focus on perceived locus of control, question 22 asked, "When special beliefs come
true, is it because somebody does something to make it come true, or because it just
happens?" Across all ages, the fifty-eight percent of students said "it just happens," and
forty percent responded "someone makes it happen." Future research may endeavor to
investigate children's perceptions of good luck and bad luck employing socioeconomic
status as a factor.
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Appendix B

BELIEF INTERVIEW
Subject #
Birth date

Location
Exp. Initials

Hi. My name is
. What is your name? That's a nice name. Today I have a
game to play with you. And in this game I'm going to ask you some questions and show
you some pictures. The fun part of this is that there are no right or wrong answers. It's not
like a test, so you can say anything that you want. Okay? Alright, here we go....
1) Do you know what a superstition or a saying about luck is?
Yes
No
Other
2) Can you explain what it is to me?

3) What would be an example of a saying about something that brings good or bad
luck?

3a. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
3b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done
Yes
3c. Did it really work?
Yes
**** 4) IF NO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1, ASK: What
your mother's back."
4a. Have you ever heard of that saying?
Yes
Yes
4b.. Do you think that is true?
4c. Have you ever done that?
Yes
4d. Did it really work?
Yes

No
that?)
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k

about "Step on a crack, break
No
No
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k

5) Can you think of any other special beliefs or sayings that bring good luck or bad
luck?
5a. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
5b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done
Yes
5c. Did it really work?
Yes

No
that?)
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
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6a. Do you believe that is true?
Yes
6b. Has it ever happened to you? (Have you ever done
Yes
6c. Did it really work?
Yes

No
that?)
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k

**** 7) Do you think there is really such a thing as luck—having good luck or bad luck?
Yes
No
D/k
8.) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have good luck?

9.) What are some examples of things that might happen if you have bad luck?

10.) Do some people have more good luck than other people, or is it even?
Who?
More
Even
D/k
1 lA.)Can anyone have good luck?

Yes

No

D/k

1 IB.) What do you have to do to get good luck?
12.)Who told you about good luck?
If no response, force choice: friends parents brother/sister
13.) Do some people have more bad luck than other people, or is it even?
Who?
More
Even
D/k
14.) Can anyone have bad luck?
Yes
15) What do you have to do to get bad luck?
16) Who told you about bad luck?

No

D/k

If no response, force choice: friends parents brother/sister
17) Have you ever heard of breaking a mirror bringing bad luck? Do you think it really
works? What about
17a. breaking a mirror
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
17b. stepping on a spider
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
17c. walking under a ladder Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
17d. black cat crossing path Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
17e. touching a window
Heard of it
Works: Yes
D/k
No
17f. spilling salt
Heard of it
Works: Yes
D/k
No
17g. the number 13
Heard of it
Works: Yes
No
D/k
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18) Do special beliefs or sayings for luck always come true, or just some of the time?
Always
Sometimes
D/k
19) Do you have to really believe it will work for it to come true?
Yes
No
D/k
20) When you really want something to come true, what can you
do?

21) What if a friend gives you a four leaf clover—who gets good luck?
Me
Friend
22) When special beliefs come true, is it because somebody does something to make it
come true, or because it just happens? Makes it
Just happens
D/k
22a. (If someone) Who does something to make it come true?

23) Who knows about special sayings for good or
23a. Do kids know about them?
23b. Do grown-ups know about them?
23c. Do babies know about them?
23d. Do cats and dogs know about them?
23e. Do flowers know about them?
23f. Do tables know about them?

bad luck?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

24) Who believes that sayings for luck really come true?
24a. Do kids believe they come true?
Yes
24b. Do grown-ups believe they come true? Yes
24c. Do babies believe they come true?
Yes
24d. Do cats and dogs believe they come true? Yes
24e. Do flowers believe they come true?
Yes
24f. Do tables believe they come true?
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No

D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k
D/k

D/k_
D/k_
D/k
D/k_
D/k
D/k_
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Appendix

B

BELIEF TASKS
Subject #
Birth date

Location
Exp. Initials

1. Juanita - no belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

2. Holly - belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

3. Tony
Ql.
Q2.
Q3.

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

4. Darren - no belief/no action
Q l . Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

5. Amanda - no belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

6. Miriam - belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

7. Riley
Ql.
Q2.
Q3.

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

No

Maybe

D/K

- belief/action
Believe?
Action?
Really happen?

- belief/no action
Believe?
Yes
Action?
Yes
Really happen? Yes

8. Malcolm - no belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
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Q2. Action?
Q3. Really happen?

Yes
Yes

No
No

Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K

9. Yolanda - belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

10. Sarah - no belief/no action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

11. David - belief/action
Ql. Believe?
Yes
Q2. Action?
Yes
Q3. Really happen? Yes

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

12. Erik
Ql.
Q2.
Q3.

No
No
No

Maybe
Maybe
Maybe

D/K
D/K
D/K

- no belief/action
Believe?
Yes
Action?
Yes
Really happen? Yes

APPENDIX D
Belief Task Stimuli Text
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Appendix

B

TEXT TO ACCOMANY THE NUMBER 13 PICTURES:
1) no belief, action
This is Tony. He has a football game today.
Tony sees a number 13 jersey. He does not believe that the number 13 will bring bad
luck.
He reaches down and picks the number 13 jersey.
2) belief, action
This is Juanita. She just joined a soccer team.
Juanita sees a number 13 jersey. She believes that the number 13 will bring bad luck.
She picks the number 13 jersey anyway.
3) belief, no action
This is Darren. He just joined a baseball team.
Darren sees a number 13 jersey. He believes that the number 13 will bring bad luck.
He does not pick the number 13 jersey.
4) no belief, no action
This is Holly. Holly has a basketball game today.
Holly sees a number 13 jersey. She does not believe that the number 13 will bring
bad luck.
She still does not pick the number 13 jersey.
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TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE BLACK CAT PICTURES
1) belief, action
This is Riley. He is walking to a friend's house.
Riley sees a black cat up ahead. He believes that if a black cat crosses in front of you,
it will bring bad luck.
He lets the cat cross in front of his path anyway.
2) no belief, action
This is Amanda. She is walking to the store.
Amanda sees a black cat up ahead. She does not believe if a black cat crosses in front
of you, it will bring bad luck.
She lets the cat cross in front of her path.
3) belief, no action
This is Miriam. She is walking to piano lessons.
Miriam sees a black cat up ahead. She believes that if a black cat crosses in front of
you, it will bring bad luck.
She does not let the cat cross in front of her.
4) no belief, no action
This is Malcolm. He is walking to the playground.
Malcolm sees a black cat up ahead. He does not believe that if a black cat crosses in
front of you, it will bring bad luck.
He does not let the cat cross in front of him

TEXT TO ACCOMPANY THE BREAKING A MIRROR PICTURES:
1) belief, action
This is Yolanda. She is getting ready for school.
Yolanda looks into the mirror on her desk. She believes that breaking a mirror will
bring bad luck.
She knocks the mirror off the desk, and it breaks.
2) no belief, action
This is David. He just got his hair cut.
David holds a mirror in his hand. He does not believe that breaking a mirror will
bring bad luck.
He drops the mirror, and it breaks.
3) belief, no action
This is Sarah. She is cleaning her room.
Sarah polishes the mirror on the wall. She believes that breaking a mirror will bring
bad luck.
She wipes off the mirror, and it does not break.
4) no belief, no action
This is Erik. He is getting ready for school.
Erik holds a mirror in his hand. He does not believe that breaking a mirror will bring
bad luck.
He holds the mirror, and it does not break.
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APPENDIX E
Informed Consent Document

WESTERN
KENTUCKY
Department of Psychology
270-745-2695
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Participant Consent Form

Western Kentucky University
1 Bi Red Wa
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Y

Bowling Green, KY 42101-3576

Dear Parents,
Your child is invited to participate in a study of children's understanding of beliefs.
This study is being conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Wester^ Kentucky University in
cooperation with your child's school. The aim of our study is to better understand how children
reason about the effects of beliefs on behavior and real world outcomes. We will compare the
responses children provide across different ages to learn about changes in children's
understanding of beliefs across development. This project will be conducted in a single 20minute session at your child's school, at a time arranged with your child's teacher. We will
coordinate the session with your child's teacher so that your child will not miss any important
learning activities.
During the session, your child will be interviewed individually and shown a set of
pictures to evaluate end sort. Various questions about beliefs and actions related tc good luck
and bad luck will be asked; your child's answers will be recorded and kept confidential by our
research staff. Your child is free to discuss the interview with you, but we ask children not to
discuss their answers with their classmates. We also will show children a series of drawings of
boys and girls who arc engaged in behavior that may bring them good luck or bad luck. We
will ask your child several simple questions about each story and ask them to sort the pictures
iiito piles. Children are told that there are no right or wrong answers to the • e v'oe staotis ar.d to
just say whatever they think. Our experience has been that children find our interview and
picture tasks to be enjoyable and many ask when they can do it again.
We would like to emphasize that your child's participation in this project is entirely
voluntary. If you or your child decide not to participate, there will be no negative consequence
of any sort for you or your child. Your child may refuse to answer any question and may
withdraw from the study at any time. All information collected in this study will be kept
strictly confidential and will only be accessible to the project staff. All results will be reported
in terms of group averages, and no children will ever be identified by name. A written report of
the group results will be available to you at your child's school upon completion of the study.
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection of Human Research Participants. The
University has filed a form entitled "'Assurance of Compliance with DHHS regulations for the
Protection of Human Subjects" with the Department of Health and Human Services. Specific
questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Katrina Phelps at (270) 745-4311. Feel free
to call if you have anylfoncems; we will be happy to provide you with further information.
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We hope that you will allow your child to participate in our study. We promise
to make it a pleasant experience and to schedule our sessions in cooperation with your
child's teacher. Please fill out your child's name and date of birth, and your child's
teacher's name below. To indicate consent, sign your name, and fill in the date at the
bottom of the form. When your child returns this letter to the teacher, regardless of
whether you respond yes or no, your child will receive a Western Kentucky University
"Big Red" pencil.
Thank you for your assistance
Sincerely.

Katrina Phelps, Ph.D. 0
Assistant Professor

Western Kentucky University
Participant Consent Form

Child's name:

.

Teacher's name:

--••

Date of birth:
•

No. I do not give my consent for my child to participate in this study.

Yes. I have read the information provide about this study, and give my consent
for my child to participate in the individual interviews that are a part of the study
conducted by Dr. Katrina Phelps of Western Kentucky University. I understand that I
may withdraw my child from the study at any time without penalty.

Parent's signature:^

^

Date:

